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IN THE SUPRF.MF COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATF OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
HARLEY E. WILLETT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with first-degree murder in 
violation of Utah Code Ann.~ 71'-5-202, 1953, as amended, in 
the shooting death of Dan Okelberry on November 20, 1982. 
Pursuant to a plea arrangement, the charge was amended to 
second-degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
<;<:; 76-5-203 and 76-2-202, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 19, 1983, appellant pled guilty to the 
amended charge before the Honorable Allen. B. Sorensen in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County. Judge 
Sorensen imposed sentence that same day of an indeterminate 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison, an 
additional year under Utah Code Ann.<> 70-3-203(1) to run 
consecutively and an additional term of five years under 
Ii; 76-3-203(1) to run consecutively. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the sentence imposed 
by the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 19, 1983, Appellant waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing and indicated a desire to enter a plea of 
guilty to the amended information (R. 99, 121). The court 
heard testimony fran two psychiatrists, or. Phillip Washhurn 
and Dr. Delbert Pearson, about appellant's competency for the 
purpose of showing he was not psychotic, that he unde rs to od 
the nature of the charges and was able to aid in his own 
defense ( R. 100, 101, 109). Roth experts stated that 
appellant was not psychotic and was able to understand and aid 
in his defense (R. 107-108, 111). Thereafter, the court found 
appellant competent to stand trial and granted leave to 
withdraw the not guilty plea previously entered (R. 114, 121). 
Appellant entered a plea of gu~lty to the charge of 
second-degree murder stating that he aided his father in 
killing Dan Okleberry (R. 122, 126). The court found the 
guilty plea to be voluntary (R. 126) after questioning 
appellant on whether he received promises or threats inducing 
the guilty plea (R. 124). Appellant stated that he also 
received no promises concerning the sentence he would be given 
on the charge (R. 124-125). 
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Prior to sentencing appellant, the lower court 
explained to him the possible penalty for second-degree murder 
and the enhancement penalties of an additional one year to run 
consecutively plus up to five additional years to run 
consecutively (R. 123). Appellant acknowledged understanding 
the possible penalties and entered no objection to their 
imposition at any time (R. 123). 
Appellant waived a presentence investigation and 
requested immediate sentencing (R. 127). The Court sentenced 
appellant on May 19, l9R3 imposing both enhancement penalties 
( R. 1 29) • No objections were raised by appellant at the time 
of sentencing as to the propriety of the sentence imposed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANT MAKF:S NO 
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD SUPPORTING HIS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In state v. Tucker, Utah, F,57 P.2d 755 (1982) I this 
Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in part due to the 
appellant's failure to make any reference to the record in his 
statement of the facts: 
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A separate and independent basis for 
the affirrnance of the trial court is that 
the defendant failed to refer to any 
portion of the record that factually 
supports his content ions on appeal. Th is 
Court will assume the correctness of the 
judgment below if counsel on appeal does 
not comply with the requirements of Rule 
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
procedure, as to making a concise 
statement of facts and citation of the 
pages in the record where they are 
supported. 
Id. at 756-757, citing Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 1/.1 IJtah 359, 
242 P.2d 297 (1957). see also State v. Vigil, Utah, 661 P.2d 
947, 948 (1983); State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 2S2, 253 
( 1983). 
Appellant fails to refer to the record to support 
any of his factual statements. Thus, he has violated Rule 75 
(p)(2) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAIVED THE ISSUE OF AN IMPROPER 
SENTENCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT AT TRIAL. 
After appellant entered his guilty plea, Judge 
Sorensen explained the possible penalties for second-degree 
murder, including the enhancement penalties under 
§ 76-3-203( l). The transcript reveals the following exhange: 
THE COURT: you understand Mr. Willett that the 
penalty for this offense can be from 
five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison? 
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MR. HARLEY WILLETT: yes I do. 
THE COIJPT: And that it can be enhanced with an 
additional one year to run 
consecutively? 
MR. HARLEY WILLE TT: yes. 
THP COURT: And it may be enhanced to have an 
additional sentence of up to five years 
to run consecutively? 
MR. HARLEY WILLETT: Yes. 
(R. 122-123). Thereafter, appellant waived preparation of a 
presentence report and chose to have sentence imposed 
irnrned i ately ( R. 127). The court imposed sentence including 
both enhancement penalties. Appellant raised no objection to 
the enhancement penalties at the time of sentencing, but has 
raised the issue for the first time in this appeal. As this 
Court has stated many t irnes, it is the general rule that 
matters raised for the first time on appeal without timely 
objection in the trial court will not be reviewed. State v. 
Mitchell, Utah, 671 P.2d 213, 214 (1983); State v. Steggell, 
Utah, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (1983). Because this issue is raised 
for the first time on appeal, this Court should not review it 
but should consider it waived. 
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POINT III 
IMPOSITION OF ENHANCEMENT PENALTIES tJNDF,R 
§ 76-3-203( l) IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
Appellant complains that imposition of hoth 
enhancement penalties under~ 76-3-203(1) resulted in his 
being twice placed in jeopardy and therefore his sentence was 
unconstitutional. He argues that either one enhancement 
penalty or the other may be imposed, but not both because thP 
United States Supreme Court held that imposition of two 
enhancement penalties is always improper in Simpson v. United 
States, 435 U.S. fi (1977). 
Simpson did not, however, hold that imposition of 
more than one firearms enhancement penalty is always 
impermissible. In that case, the defendant was charqed with 
aggravated bank robbery. The statute setting out the 
pu-ishment for aggravated bank robhery itself enhanced the 
punishment for the commission of the crime using a dangerous 
weapon. The Court held, therefore, that 'the separate general 
statute imposing a firearms enhancement penalty could not also 
be invoked against the defendant. The result was partially 
supported by the principle that a specific statute controls 
over a more general statute dealing with the same subject 
matter. see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 4fl'l-4'ln 
( 1973). The Court also stressed that Congress, in its 
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discussions over the federal firearms statute,l explicitly 
stated that the statute was not to be used where specific 
statutes already provided for an enhanced penalty for use of a 
firearm. Id. at 1/-15. 
The Utah firearms enchancement statute is 
distinguishable from the federal firearms statute construed in 
Simpson. Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-3-203( 1) states: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as follows: 
( 1) In the case of a felony of the first 
degree, for a term at [sic] not less than 
five years and which may be for life but 
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a 
facsimile or the representation of a 
firearm was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted 
for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently 
The wording of the Utah statute explicitly authorizes 
imposition of both a one year mandatory t.erm and up to a five 
year discretionary term. The united States Supreme court 
recently held that multiple sentences do not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause where a statute clearly authorizes 
1 18 u.s.C. § 924(c) provides in part: "Whoever .• uses 
a firearm . . or carries a firearm unlawfully during the 
commission of any felony . . shall, in addition to the 
punishment providerl for the commission of such felony, be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year 
nor more than ten years." 
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cumulative punishments. Missouri v. Hunter, 11.s. , l ()3 
s.ct. 673 (1983). "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more 
than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended." Id. at 678. Seu 
also, Government of Virgin Islands v. Soto, 71R F.2d 72 ( lrl 
Cir. 1983). 
There is no conflict here as in Simpson between a 
general statute and a specific statute both providing 
punishment for the same offense. Here, there is only one 
statute, the clear import of which is to allow discretionary 
cumulative punishments for the use of a firearm. Th is Court 
must construe a statute "according to the fair import of fits] 
terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the 
law." Utah Code Ann.!; 76-1-106 (1978). It is a longstanding 
rule of statutory construction that reviewing courts defer to 
the evident purpose of the Legislature to attain a certain 
end. State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, ?6 P.2d 'l55 (1933). 
Additionally, in determining this legisla.tive intent, courts 
should consider the purposes sought to be accomplished through 
enactment of a particular statute. State v. Helm, Utah, 563 
P.2d 794 (1977). Insuring proper effect to legislative intent 
and purpose is a primary consideration. Parson Asphalt 
Production, Inc. v. Utah state Tax Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 
397 (1980); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp. 
( 1980) . 
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Utah, 609 P. 2d 934 
The purpose of ~ 76-3-203(1) is to impose an 
additional penalty on defendants who use a firearm in the 
commission of a crime and to increase that penalty where the 
circumstances of the crime suggest a more stringent sentence 
is appropriate. Clearly the Legislature in the case of 
§ 76-3-203( 1) intended that the trial court be left with 
disc ret ion to impose an additional enhancement penalty in 
appropriate cases. Nothing in the wording of the section sets 
forth an intent to prohihit cumulative punishments. For this 
reason, imposition of a discretionary cumulative penalty is 
not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Hunter, 103 
S.Ct. at 673. 
Appellant does not assert that the trial court 
abused its discretion in imposing the second enhancement 
penalty. Even if that were an issue in this case, this Court 
will not overturn a sentence that is within the statutory 
scheme unless it is clearly excessive or a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Gerrard, Utah, 584 p.2d 885, 887-888 
(197R). No such showing has been made in this case. The 
trial court's sentence should, therefore, be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant raises the issue of double jeopardy for 
the first time on appeal and, therefore, has waived the issue, 
A separate ground for summary af firmance is that appellant 
failed to cite to the transcript to support his statement of 
facts. 
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Even if this Court reaches the double jeopardy 
claim, appellant's sentence should be affirmed because the 
imposition of a second enhancement penalty was clearly 
contemplated by the Legislature and thus is not violative of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /~;;zfday of June, lq84. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
'-£~ fir'--
J. STEPHEN MIKITA 
Assistant Attorney General 
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